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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 




                            Petitioner 
                                        
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                                   Respondent  
_____________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals  
(Agency No. A035-748-345) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
February 10, 2015 
______________ 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges. 
 






VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This petition for review of a removal order presents for our consideration the 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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following three principal issues: (1) Is petitioner Carter Baboolall’s conviction under 
N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 220.39(1) for the attempted sale of a controlled substance 
an “aggravated felony” under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), so that Baboolall is not eligible for asylum 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)? (2) Does his state-court controlled-substance 
conviction qualify as a “particularly serious crime,” making him ineligible for 
withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii)?  (3) Is Baboolall 
nonetheless entitled to deferral of removal to his native Guyana by virtue of the country’s 
alleged hostility to homosexuals under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), see 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane, or Degrading Treatment of 
Punishment, art. 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987)?  For the reasons that follow, 
we find that Baboolall’s state-court conviction is an “aggravated felony” that qualified as 
a “particularly serious crime,” and that he did not establish that deferral of removal is 
warranted.  Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.   
I.  
 Baboolall entered the United States from Guyana as an 18-month-old in 1978 and 
was granted lawful permanent resident status.  In 1998, Baboolall was convicted in New 
York of attempted sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in violation of N.Y. 
Penal Law, §§ 110.00 (attempt) and 220.39(1) (sale of a controlled substance).  In 2013, 
the Department of Homeland Security served Baboolall with a notice to appear, charging 
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that he was removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony and a controlled 
substance violation pursuant to INA §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i), respectively, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (B)(i).   
 On July 3, 2013, Baboolall appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and, 
through counsel, denied the allegation concerning his 1998 conviction and contested his 
removability.  Baboolall also applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, 
and relief under Article 3 of CAT.  On September 25, 2013, the IJ took evidence and 
heard testimony to determine whether Baboolall was removable or qualified for 
discretionary relief.   
 Baboolall claimed to be bisexual and homosexual, despite being engaged to a 
woman and fathering three children with another woman.  He testified he was concerned 
that he would be subject to persecution, ridicule, and abuse if he were forced to return to 
Guyana because Guyanese laws criminalize homosexuality.  Baboolall submitted various 
reports and Guyanese statutes in support of his claim.  The IJ admitted several documents 
from the Government into evidence, including a record of Baboolall’s 1998 conviction 
and the corresponding criminal information charging him with attempted sale of heroin.   
 At the close of the hearing, the IJ addressed the threshold issue of whether 
Baboolall’s state-court controlled substance conviction constituted an “aggravated 
felony” under the INA, which rendered him ineligible for asylum.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(b)(2)(B)(i).  The IJ properly noted that there were two potential routes to make this 
determination: the “illicit trafficking route” and the “hypothetical federal felony route.”  
4 
 
Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 313–16 (3d Cir. 2002).  To qualify under the “illicit 
trafficking route,” Baboolall’s conviction must have involved “the unlawful trading or 
dealing of a controlled substance.”  Id. at 305.  The IJ concluded that the “illicit 
trafficking route” inquiry was inconclusive because there was “no information in the 
conviction record that there was in fact an actual monetary transaction that occurred at 
the time of the attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance.”  (App. at 23.)   
 Accordingly, the IJ next applied the “hypothetical federal felony” approach to 
determine whether the 1998 conviction was an “aggravated felony.”  Under this analysis, 
a state drug conviction qualifies as an “aggravated felony” if it would be punishable as a 
felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).  Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 315.  
The IJ recognized that in making this determination, he was presumptively required to 
apply the “formal categorical approach,” relying only on the statute of conviction and the 
relevant statutory definitions to decide whether the conviction qualified as an “aggravated 
felony.”  See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 147–48 (3d Cir. 2004).  The relevant state 
statute of conviction here, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1), provides that “[a] person is guilty 
of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree when he knowingly and 
unlawfully sells . . . a narcotic drug.”  The term “narcotic drug” is defined under New 
York law by reference to schedules of controlled substances set forth in N.Y. Public 
Health Law § 3306.  See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(7).  The IJ, observing that the 
schedule of controlled substances under federal law did not match the New York 
schedule of controlled substances, looked “to the conviction record for the limited 
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purpose of determining what drug was involved [in Baboolall’s prosecution].”  (App. at 
23.)  The document charging Baboolall with a crime, the criminal information, reads, in 
relevant part: 
[T]his information, accuses the defendant of the crime of 
[attempted] CRIMINAL SALE OF A CONTORLLED 
SUBSTANCE IN THE THIRD (3) DEGREE, in violation of 
Penal Law Section 110/220.39, committed as follows:  
The defendant, in the County of New York, City of New 
York, on or about 9/27/97, Attempted to knowingly and 
unlawfully sell to [another individual], a narcotic drug, to wit 
Heroin.   
(App. at 230.)  Based upon the charging instrument, the IJ concluded that the “narcotic 
drug” involved in Baboolall’s conviction was heroin.   
 The IJ then determined that Baboolall could have been prosecuted federally for 
this conduct pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846,1 the analogous federal statues to 
N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 220.39(1).  Because a violation of § 841(a) for the 
attempted sale of heroin was punishable by a term of imprisonment “of not more than 20 
years” under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), the IJ concluded that Baboolall’s state-court 
conviction qualified as an aggravated felony within the meaning of INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).   
 An “aggravated felony” automatically constitutes a “particularly serious crime” 
for purposes of disqualifying an alien for asylum.  See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i), 
                                              
1 21 U.S.C. § 846 states, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who attempts or 
conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same 
penalties as those prescribed for the offense[.]”   
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8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (B)(i).  Accordingly, the IJ denied Baboolall’s 
application for asylum. 
 The IJ then turned to the request for withholding of removal under INA § 
241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), which affords relief to an alien who would be 
threatened in the country of removal “because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Withholding of removal, 
however, is not available to an alien previously convicted of a “particularly serious 
crime.”  8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).  An alien sentenced to a prison term of at least five 
years is conclusively considered to have committed a “particularly serious crime.”  Id. § 
1231(b)(3)(B).  With respect to an alien whose sentence is less than five years, such as 
Baboolall, the INA vests in the Attorney General the discretion to decide whether the 
crime is “particularly serious.”  Id.  The Attorney General, in Matter of Y-L-, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 270 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2002), exercised that discretion in concluding that “aggravated 
felonies involving unlawful trafficking in controlled substances presumptively constitute 
‘particularly serious crimes’ . . . , and only under the most extenuating circumstances that 
are both extraordinary and compelling would departure from this interpretation be 
warranted or permissible.”  Id.  The Attorney General then identified what an alien would 
need to show, at a minimum, to rebut the presumption that the alien’s drug trafficking 
crime was a “particularly serious” one:   
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very 
modest amount of money paid for the drugs in the offending 
transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the alien in 
7 
 
the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the 
absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or 
otherwise, associated with the offense; (5) the absence of any 
organized crime or terrorist organization involvement, direct 
or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; and (6) the 
absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the activity or 
transaction on juveniles. 
 Id. at 276–77.  The Attorney General made clear that “[o]nly if all of these criteria were 
demonstrated by an alien would it be appropriate to consider whether other, more unusual 
circumstances (e.g., the prospective distribution was solely for social purposes, rather 
than for profit) might justify departure from the default interpretation that drug trafficking 
felonies are ‘particularly serious crimes.’”  Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).    
In Baboolall’s case, the IJ found that Baboolall had “failed to show that he was a 
merely peripheral participant in the criminal activity.” (App. at 37.)  Thus, his controlled 
substance conviction was for a “particularly serious crime,” precluding withholding of 
removal.   
 Finally, the IJ addressed Baboolall’s request for CAT protection.  Concluding that 
Baboolall’s claim that he would be tortured on account of his sexual preference was 
“speculative at best,” (App. at 46), the IJ denied the request for deferral of removal under 
CAT.   
 Baboolall timely appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  The BIA affirmed for 
substantially the same reasons articulated by the IJ.  Baboolall now petitions this Court 




 We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  “Because 
the basis for [Baboolall’s] removal is his conviction for an aggravated felony, our 
jurisdiction is limited . . . to constitutional claims or questions of law raised by his 
appeal.”  Roye v. Att’y Gen., 693 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted).  “We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo. . . .”  Kaplun 
v. Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010).  Although our review is limited to the 
BIA’s decision on the merits, we may consider the IJ’s decision and reasoning “insofar as 
the BIA deferred to it.”  Roye, 693 F.3d at 339. 
A. The Aggravated Felony Determination 
 The Government first argues that Baboolall waived his challenge to the IJ’s 
aggravated felony determination because he failed to explicitly raise it before the BIA. In 
his appeal to the BIA, Baboolall stated that the IJ “erred in determining that [his] 1998 
conviction was a removable conviction in that the statutory listing for the offense 
includes conduct which is both an aggravated felony and not an aggravated felony.”  
(App. at 19.)  Although not an explicit challenge to the aggravated felony determination, 
this assertion was sufficient to avoid waiver of the issue.  As we have explained, “so long 
as an immigration petitioner makes some effort, however insufficient, to place the Board 
on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have 
exhausted her administrative remedies.”  Yan Lan Wu v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d 
Cir. 2005).  Here, the BIA was placed on notice that the aggravated felony determination 
was at issue.   
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 We now turn to the merits of Baboolall’s claim.  As both parties note, Baboolall’s 
removability hinges on whether his 1998 New York conviction is an “aggravated felony” 
under the INA.  An “aggravated felony” is defined as “illicit trafficking in a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as 
defined in section 924(c) of Title 18).”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  In turn, 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(2) defines “drug trafficking crime” to mean “any felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act.”  Thus, Baboolall’s 1998 conviction constitutes an 
aggravated felony if the state-court offense of conviction is equivalent to a felony 
conviction under the CSA.  Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 Baboolall contends that the IJ and the BIA erred in applying the modified 
categorical approach by going beyond the record of conviction.  Asserting that “the 
specific substance underlying a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) is not an 
element of the crime,” (Appellant’s Br. at 17), and that the federal and New York 
schedule of controlled substances were found by the IJ to not be identical, Baboolall 
argues that in the absence of knowing what substance was involved in his conviction, 
“the IJ would have had to conclude that that a conviction under N.Y. Pen. Law 
§220.39(1) is categorically not a conviction for an ‘aggravated felony’ as defined in the 
INA.”  (Id. at 18.)  In support of this argument, Baboolall relies upon Moncrieffe v. 
Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).  In Moncrieffe, the Court held that if the state statute of 
conviction covers conduct that would not qualify as a drug trafficking felony under 
federal law, the alien’s conviction cannot qualify as an aggravated felony.  Id. at 1686–
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87.  Specifically, the Court ruled that “[i]f a noncitizen's conviction for a marijuana 
distribution offense fails to establish that the offense involved either remuneration or 
more than a small amount of marijuana, the conviction is not for an aggravated felony 
under the INA.”  Id. at 1693–94.  Moncrieffe affords Baboolall no relief because the 
definition of “narcotic drug” in N. Y. Penal Law § 220.00(7) specifically excludes 
marijuana, and Baboolall has not shown that N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) criminalizes 
conduct that would not be a felony under federal law.    
 Baboolall further argues that the IJ and BIA were limited to considering only the 
statute of conviction under our en banc opinion in Rojas v. Att’y Gen., 728 F.3d 203 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (en banc).  In Rojas, the petitioner was convicted under a Pennsylvania statute 
that prohibited “[t]he use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the 
purpose of . . . introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation of this 
act.”  35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32).  The petitioner’s guilty plea colloquy did 
not identify the precise controlled substance involved, Rojas, 728 F.3d at 206, and the 
Pennsylvania statute was similarly silent, see 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 780-113(a)(32).  
We held that the categorical approach was inapplicable because there was no analogous 
federal statute “against which Pennsylvania's paraphernalia statute can be compared.”  
Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215.  As the modified categorical approach is “merely a ‘tool for 
implementing the categorical approach,’” we concluded that it too did not apply.  Id. at 
216 (quoting Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013)).   
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 Contrary to Baboolall’s assertions, Rojas did not discard the modified categorical 
approach in drug possession and distribution cases.  Rather, we held that neither the 
categorical nor the modified categorical approach was in play because there was no 
comparable federal statute and the record was silent as to the precise drug involved.  
Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215–16.  In this case, N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39 is analogous to 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403, 405 (2d Cir. 2013) adhered to 
on reh'g, 723 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a conviction under § 220.39 for 
attempted sale of cocaine qualifies as an aggravated felony).  As the IJ recognized, 
because there are analogous state and federal statutes, the formal categorical approach 
presumptively applies.  Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290.  However, where a statute lists 
alternative elements that implicate the same criminal behavior, an IJ may use the 
modified categorical approach and review a limited set of documents, including “the 
criminal information,” to determine what underlying conduct supported the finding of 
guilt.  Id. at 291–93.  Similar to a statute that includes alternative elements, the New York 
drug schedules delineate the various controlled substances that satisfy the “narcotic drug” 
requirement for purposes of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1).  The IJ noted that the New 
York schedules differ from their federal counterparts, warranting a limited review of the 
record of conviction to determine whether Baboolall’s criminal conduct would be 
prosecutable as a felony under the CSA.  Compare N.Y. Public Health Law § 3306, with 
21 U.S.C. § 812.  It may have been unnecessary for the IJ to examine the criminal 
information in this case because there has been no showing that the New York schedule 
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of controlled substances includes substances that are not on the federal schedule.  That is, 
a conviction under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) may necessarily involve a substance 
classified as a controlled substance under federal law.  See Pascual 707 F.3d at 405 
(holding that a conviction under § 220.39 qualifies as an aggravated felony under the 
categorical approach).  In any event, we conclude that the IJ properly employed the 
modified categorical approach in consulting the criminal information to determine the 
precise drug involved in Baboolall’s 1998 conviction.  See Garcia v. Att’y. Gen., 462 
F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that “we may appropriately examine [the criminal] 
complaint if departure from the formal categorical approach is appropriate”).   
 Baboolall argues that the record of conviction is ambiguous as to the actual drug 
he attempted to sell, noting that the “Certificate of Disposition Indictment” does not 
identify “the specific drug involved in the conviction. . . .” (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  The 
failure of this particular document to name the drug involved in Baboolall’s crime did not 
preclude the IJ and BIA from looking to the criminal information as a reliable source for 
determining the precise controlled substance involved in Baboolall’s criminal conduct.  
See Garcia, 462 F.3d at 293. Accordingly, we conclude that the Baboolall’s conviction 
was appropriately classified as an “aggravated felony.” 
B. The “Particularly Serious Crime” Determination 
 Baboolall additionally contends “that his 199[8] conviction is not for a 
‘particularly serious crime’” under Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, and therefore the IJ erred in 
denying his petition for withholding of removal.  (Appellant’s Br. at 15.)  As noted 
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above, the IJ applied the holding of Y-L- that all six elements of the exceptional 
circumstances test must be met to justify consideration of discretionary withholding of 
removal when an alien has been convicted of a drug trafficking offense.  Id. at 276–77.  
Baboolall has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is 
entitled to such relief.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(d)(2) (“If the evidence indicates the 
applicability of one or more of the grounds for denial of withholding enumerated in the 
Act, the applicant shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that such grounds do not apply.”).  Baboolall was convicted of attempting to sell heroin, 
making him an active and willful participant in a serious drug transaction.  We conclude 
that Baboolall failed to meet his burden of showing that his involvement was “merely 
peripheral” and, thus, the IJ properly denied his petition for withholding.   
C. Denial of Relief under CAT 
 Baboolall next asserts that the IJ erred in denying him relief under CAT.  
Baboolall’s challenge on this point is purely factual, as he criticizes the IJ’s evaluation of 
the evidence.  (Appellant’s Br. at 22–26.)  As the Government points out and we 
previously noted, our jurisdiction is limited to constitutional claims and questions of law.   
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(C) and (D).  Indeed, in his reply brief, Baboolall states that he 
is essentially challenging the IJ’s “finding regarding what is likely to happen if 
Petitioner’s [sic] is removed.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 11.)  A conclusion as to what 
will happen to him upon his return to Guyana is a finding of fact and, thus, outside our 
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jurisdiction.  See Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 271 (“what is likely to happen to the petitioner if 
removed” is a finding of fact).   
 We nonetheless retain jurisdiction to resolve whether the undisputed factual record 
supports the BIA’s legal conclusions concerning CAT.  Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., 455 F.3d 
409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006).2  Baboolall carries the burden of establishing “‘that it is more 
likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of 
removal.’” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 268 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).  “Torture” is the 
deliberate infliction of “severe pain or suffering . . . by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”  
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1).  As the IJ and the BIA noted, the evidence established that 
attitudes toward homosexuals in Guyana are mixed, laws against homosexual activity go 
largely unenforced, and the occasional police harassment of homosexuals is not 
condoned, propagated, or supported by the Guyanese government.  Accordingly, the BIA 
had ample grounds for finding that Baboolall failed to demonstrate it was more likely 
than not he would be tortured.   
III.  
  For the reasons discussed above, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
2 As reflected herein, we have jurisdiction over the questions of law that Baboolall 
raises, and thus we deny the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
